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Inequality in exposure to crime, social disorganisation and collective efficacy: 
Evidence from Greater Manchester, United Kingdom 
 




This paper assesses the relevance of social disorganisation and collective efficacy in 
accounting for neighbourhood inequalities in the exposure to crime. Specifically, it 
questions the potential of community and voluntary organisations to enhance informal 
social control and reduce exposure to crime. It utilises calls-for-service (incident) data for 
Greater Manchester (UK) and a Bayesian spatio-temporal modelling approach. Contrary 
to expectations, the research finds that measures of social disorganisation (concentrated 
disadvantage aside) and collective efficacy hold a limited effect on neighbourhood 
exposure to crime. We discuss the implications of these findings for criminological inquiry 
and theoretical development, highlighting the necessity of such endeavour to account for 
the national political-economy and welfare regime of research settings.  
 
Introduction  
Concentrated disadvantage (poverty), social disorganisation and its inverse, collective 
efficacy, have long been proposed to account for substantial proportion of inequality in 
the exposure to crime at the neighbourhood level. Following the ground breaking 
research of Shaw and McKay (1942), Sampson and colleagues reaffirmed that 
concentrated disadvantage interwoven with ethnic heterogeneity, residential mobility and 
family disruption (dimensions of social disorganisation), served to lessen social ties and 
weaken informal social control, leading to neighbourhoods facing increased exposure to 
crime (Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989; Sampson et al., 1997). In contrast, 
they found that aspects of community organisation relating to civic participation served 
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to enhance social ties and strengthen informal social control (or collective efficacy), 
leading to neighbourhoods facing decreased exposure to crime (Sampson and Groves 
1989; Sampson 2006). Whilst supported by a plethora of studies undertaken in settings 
across the United States (US), the explanatory potency of (dimensions of) social 
disorganisation and collective efficacy has been questioned in European settings 
(Pauwels et al. 2018). Like crime itself, the study of crime is necessarily place and time 
specific. The theoretical and empirical evolution of criminological enquiry has been 
conditioned by the historical context of the polities, as well as the characteristics of the 
urban environments, in which it has taken place (Bannister and O’Sullivan 2020). In these 
terms, the relevance of social disorganisation and collective efficacy (inclusive of their 
specified dimensions) in accounting for inequality in the exposure to crime at the 
neighbourhood level, requires being considered with reference to the prevailing context 
of cities and the polities in which they reside.  
 
A key proposition of social disorganisation theory is that voluntary and community 
organisations, via the provision of services and the enhancement of social ties, serve to 
strengthen informal social control and consequently decrease exposure to crime at the 
neighbourhood level (Peterson et al. 2000; Sampson and Groves 1989). In this vein, 
Sampson (2012) proposed that collective civic action holds a stronger association with 
the presence of community organisations than with individual social ties or civic group 
membership, following discovery that neighbourhoods with a higher density of voluntary 
and community organisations exhibited lower crime rates in Chicago (US). Subsequent 
studies, also undertaken in the US, have found the effects of voluntary and community 
organisations on crime to vary according to the characteristics of the organisations 
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themselves (e.g., type of service, length of operation), as well as the context of the 
neighbourhoods in which they operate (Slocum et al. 2013; Wo et al. 2016).  
 
Evidence of the effect of neighbourhood organisation infrastructure on crime outside the 
US is sparse. In light of this, and in recognition of the distinct socio-political contexts of 
the US and the United Kingdom (UK), this research seeks to re-examine social 
disorganisation and collective efficacy, and in particular in the role of neighbourhood 
organisation infrastructure in shaping inequalities in the exposure to crime. We explore 
whether neighbourhoods with a higher density of community and voluntary organisations 
are exposed to lower crime rates. Further,  we assess whether such an effect is 
conditional on the characteristics of these organisations and of the neighbourhoods in 
which they operate.  We utilise calls-for-service to the Police to examine both violent 
crime and nuisance crime, enabling an assessment of whether the influence of 
community infrastructure varies according to the severity of crime.  
 
In contrast to previous studies, most of which are restricted to cross-sectional analyses, 
we deploy a Bayesian spatio-temporal modelling approach, which uses Integrated 
Nested Laplace Approximation (INLA), enabling the research to account for the spatial 
and temporal dependence structures of crime rates. The remainder of the paper is 
structured as follows. In the next section we assess existing understanding of how 
concentrated disadvantage, social disorganisation and its inverse, collective efficacy, 
serve to shape inequality in the exposure to crime at the neighbourhood level. 
Thereafter, we present our data, methodology and results. In the final section, we 




Social disorganisation  
Crime does not vary randomly across space (Block and Block, 1995).  Ecological studies 
have accounted for the uneven patterning of crime at the neighbourhood level through 
reference to structural characteristics, particularly the concentration of poverty (Sharkey 
et al. 2016). Social disorganisation theory, initially developed by Shaw and McKay (1942) 
in Chicago, proposes that concentrated poverty, high levels of residential mobility and 
ethnic diversity, serve to weaken the social networks, norm and value systems required 
to exercise informal control, leading to higher rates of crime. More recently, family 
disruption, the nature of local friendship networks, the presence of unsupervised groups 
and low organisational participation, have been identified as further important 
neighbourhood level processes underlying social disorganisation (Sampson, 1987; 
Sampson and Groves, 1989). Finally, higher levels of urbanisation are expected to 
weaken the capacity to establish local kinship and friendship networks and lower 
organisational participation (Sampson and Groves 1989:782). 
 
Whether neighbourhood-level processes mediate the association between poverty and 
crime (Sharkey et al. 2016 :625) or not, they tend to be inexorably linked.  In other words, 
neighbourhoods with higher levels of poverty tend also to exhibit higher levels of 
residential turnover, ethnic heterogeneity and family disruption and so forth. US-based 
studies have shown, for example, that high residential turnover is often a symptom of 
neighbourhood racial transition and White flight, acting as a trigger to neighbourhood 
decline (Fong and Sibuya 2003). Similarly, low socio-economic status neighbourhoods 
are also those with the highest concentrations of Black African Americans, who typically 
exhibit significantly higher rates of poverty and family disruption compared to White 
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groups (Sampson 1987). Finally, neighbourhoods with the highest levels of ethnic 
diversity also exhibit the lowest levels of social cohesion (Alesina and Ferrara 2000; 
Putnam 2007) and collective efficacy (Sampson 2012; Hipp and Wo 2015).  
 
These findings, however, are not necessarily generalisable to European contexts. In the 
UK, for example, neighbourhoods with the highest levels of concentrated disadvantage 
are neither inherently residentially unstable (Bailey and Livingston, 2007) nor necessarily 
the most ethnically diverse (Garner 2011). Moreover, studies have generally shown that 
it is concentrated disadvantage and not ethnic diversity that erodes social cohesion (Letki 
2008; Becares et al. 2011; Sturgis et al. 2011). The significance of race and of racism in 
delineating and accounting for inequalities in the exposure to crime in the UK should not 
be understated (Bowling and Phillips, 2002), yet it does not hold the pre-eminent position 
that it does as an explanation for inequalities in exposure to crime in the US (see inter 
alia Sampson 2012). Moreover, whilst the spatial concentration of poverty in both the US 
and the UK might have been shaped by similar drivers (e.g., economic restructuring, the 
rise of insecure low-income work, and increasing immigration (Glasmeier et al. 2008)), 
the policy response to these issues have differed markedly. In particular, the social and 
political attitudes towards welfare in the US has led to anti-poverty policies placing 
greater emphasis on neighbourhood infrastructure creation than in the UK, which has 




Neighbourhood organisation infrastructure 
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Sampson (2006:153) defines collective efficacy as ‘shared beliefs in a neighbourhood’s 
capability for action to achieve an intended effect, coupled with an active sense of 
engagement’. As such, collective efficacy is associated with the presence of strong 
primary networks, such as kinship and local voluntary organisations (ibid), understood to 
inculcate shared beliefs and nurture engagement. Sampson et al. (1997 and 1999) found 
collective efficacy to moderate the effect of concentrated disadvantage on exposure to 
violence in neighbourhoods in Chicago.  Whilst a plethora of studies have offered support 
for the role of collective efficacy in moderating crime in US cities, there have been mixed 
findings of its effect in European cities (see Pauwels et al. (2018) for a review).  
 
In a recent study, Bruinsma et al. (2018) evaluated Shaw and McKay’s classic social 
disorganisation model alongside Sampson’s collective efficacy models in a study of the 
Hague (Netherlands). They found characteristics of neighbourhood social 
disorganisation and not of collective efficacy to explain variations in crime. In contrast, 
however, and in a comparative study in Chicago and Stockholm (Sweden), Sampson 
and Wikström (2008) found neighbourhood social inequality and characteristics of 
collective efficacy to be the strongest predictors of social order and violent crime in both 
cities. In a study of Peterborough (UK), Wikström et al. (2012) found that poor collective 
efficacy served to explain violent crime, serious theft and vandalism. Finally, Sutherland 
et al. (2013) found characteristics of collective efficacy to be weakly associated with 
neighbourhood levels of violent crime after controlling for characteristics of social 
disorganisation.  
 
Such divergent findings are, of course, partly reflective of the different measures 
(dimensions) of collective efficacy utilised in these studies, and not necessarily of the 
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diverse contexts in which they took place. Some have drawn directly on survey measures 
in which respondents were asked about their likelihood of engaging in activities to 
maintain social control (Sampson 2006; Hipp 2016). However, others have questioned 
the use of surveys to capture ecological processes, such as informal control and disorder, 
as they run the risk of producing artificial and conflicting findings (Pauwels et al. 2018). 
More recently, studies have drawn on measures relating to the nature and density of 
social ties within neighbourhoods, including the membership and presence of voluntary, 
community and non-profit organisations (Sampson and Groves 2009; Wo et al. 2016; 
Vermeulen et al., 2011).  
 
Voluntary and community organisations are understood as being able to enhance 
informal social control through structuring social ties and promoting shared expectations 
via role models and exposure to mainstream values (Slocum et al.  2013). Sampson 
(2012:183) argues that the ‘capacity for sustained collective action is conditioned mainly 
by the presence of established institutions and organisations that can be appropriated in 
the service of collective action goals’, having found that the presence of community-
based organisations predicted collective efficacy and collective civic action in the 
neighbourhoods of Chicago. Existing research in the US has shown that a broad range 
of neighbourhood organisation infrastructure (i.e., schools, churches, libraries, learning 
services, recreational activities, family and employment support services) to hold 
protective effects on crime (Sampson 2006; Corconan et al. 2018; Slocum et al. 2013; 
Wo et al. 2016).   
 
The causal link between neighbourhood organisation infrastructure and crime has 
remained elusive, however, given that the presence of such infrastructure may itself be 
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conditional on the socio-economic context (and / or social organisation) of the 
neighbourhood. In a study of the South Bronx (New York, US), Slocum et al. (2013) found 
that neighbourhood disadvantage moderated the effect of neighbourhood organisation 
infrastructure, with some types of charities (i.e., educational and employment) being 
associated with an increase in violent crime in the most deprived neighbourhoods and a 
decrease in violent crime in the least deprived neighbourhoods. Finally, Wo et al. (2016), 
using longitudinal data on charities and crime across 10 US cities, found that the age of 
the voluntary and community organisation influenced its protective effect, with beneficial 
outcomes taking several years to manifest.  
 
The presence of neighbourhood organisation infrastructure may also be conditional upon 
the political and cultural context, and welfare regime, of the setting. In the UK, successive 
recent governments have sought to increase the involvement of voluntary and 
community organisations in welfare provision, with a commensurate move to decrease 
the involvement of the state in this area (Mythen et al. 2012; Labao et al. 2018; 
McAreavey and Brown 2019). In these terms, voluntary organisations in the UK have 
filled the vacuum created by a shrinking state and their spatial manifestation is reflective, 
at least in part, of pre-existing public service infrastructure. In contrast, community 
development may be more bottom-up, grassroots-driven in the US (Kerlin 2006; Haugh 
and Kitson 2007), where its liberal non-profit regime, is less reliant on government 
funding for its existence (Clifford et al. 2010). Thus, and in this context, community 
organisational infrastructure organisations may more closely reflect the civic capacity of 
the local communities in which they operate and, vitally, of the collective action required 
to enact informal social control (Warren 2001; Sampson 2012).  
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As a final consideration, existing research has found that the association between the 
characteristics of social disorganisation and crime differs according to the measure of 
crime utilised (Klinger and Bridges 1997; Slocum et al. 2013). Survey-based measures 
of crime, in contrast to police recorded crime, have more consistently shown that the 
structural characteristics of communities correlate with crime rates (Danielsson 2019). 
The reliance of ecological studies on recorded crime has been criticised for some time, 
as not all crime is reported to, or recorded by, the police, cumulatively serving to 
underestimate the burden of crime on communities (Skogan 1984; Warner and Pierce 
1993; Sampson and Groves 1999).  Calls-for-service (incident data) to the police serve 
to overcome any bias arising from crime recording, serving as a better measure of 
neighbourhood crime (Warner and Pierce 1993). As such, and particularly in the US, 
calls-for-service data are increasingly being deployed in studies of crime (Warner and 
Pierce 1993; Sherman 1995; Lum 2011; Weisburd et al. 2006; Roh and Choo, 2008). We 
discuss measures of crime more fully in the data section, below. 
 
Data and methodology 
 
Study area and units of analysis 
In this study we present an analysis of calls-for-service to the Police, as measured across 
Lower Super Output Areas (LSOAs), in Greater Manchester (GM), United Kingdom (UK). 
GM is the second largest metropolitan region in the UK, located in the North-West of 
England.  The metropolitan region comprises of ten local authorities with a population of 
2.8 million (ONS 2019). There are 1,673 LSOAs in GM. LSOAs are Census geographies, 
defined on the basis of homogenous population size (approximately 1,500 people) and 
household characteristics, and tend to be framed by natural geographical boundaries. 
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LSOAs have been argued to match both experts’ and residents’ perceptions of 
neighbourhoods (Brunton-Smith et al., 2014). As the interest of this study is on 
community level processes, non-residential neighbourhoods with a workplace population 
greater than the residential population (9%) were excluded from the analysis.  
 
Measures of crime 
In the UK, the two main sources of information on crime are offences recorded by the 
Police and experiences of victimisation drawn from the Crime Survey for England and 
Wales. Both measures hold limitations (see ONS 2019). The Crime Survey for England 
and Wales (CSEW) is considered to be the most accurate measure of the experience of 
crime but it based on a small survey sample and for this reason, cannot produce reliable 
crime estimates at the neighbourhood level. The survey is also subject to sources of bias 
arising from survey measurement error, response error, and questionnaire error 
(Pauwels et al. 2018). Police recorded crime records are the main source of information 
on crime levels and trends in small areas but are an imperfect measure of crime as they 
are estimated from the number of notifiable crimes reported to, and subsequently 
recorded by, the Police. One of the main sources of bias in Police recorded crime records 
is the under-counting of offences, which has led to the declassification of police recorded 
crime data as national statistics (ONS 2019). The under-recording of crime results from 
rules governing the recording of data and operational decisions in respect to the 
allocation of resources (ONS 2019).  
 
An alternative measure of crime that is increasingly finding use in ecological studies of 
crime (see inter alia Sherman 1995; Weisburd et al., 2006; Weisburd 2015), and 
specifically in the assessment of social disorganisation in neighbourhoods in the US (see 
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inter alia Warner and Pierce 1993; Roh and Choo 2008), is reported crime (incidents) 
from calls-for-service to the Police. Calls-for-service data are considered to be free from 
some of the bias inherent in official crime records introduced during the process of 
recording a crime incident (Warner and Pierce 1993). Incidents are reported to the Police 
by the public in a number of ways, for example, through 999 calls for assistance at a 
Police station, or to a police officer on patrol (ONS, 2019). Although calls-for-service are 
still subject to the public’s willingness to report an incident, they are considered to be 
closer to the ‘lived experience of crime’ since they are not subject to changes in counting 
rules, definitions, or Police responses to crime, but rather on citizen reports of crime to 
the police (Warner and Pierce 1993).  
 
The calls-for-service data span the period 2012 to 2016.  The analysis considers both 
violent and nuisance crimes. Violent crime has been the subject of previous studies of 
social disorganisation in both US and European cities (Peterson et al. 2000; Sampson et 
al. 2013; Wikström 2008; Wikström et al. 2012; Sutherland et al. 2013; Danielsson, 2019) 
and thus, its assessment here, enables benchmarking with this body of work. We also 
assess nuisance crime as we expect socially organised neighbourhoods (those with 
greater collective efficacy capabilities) to be able to exert greater informal control over 
less severe offences (Warner and Clubb 2013).   
  
Violent crime covers incidents wherein the victim is intentionally stabbed, punched, 
kicked, pushed, jostled, etc., or threatened with violence whether or not there is any injury 
(Home Office, 2010). Nuisance crime typically relates to incidents involving ‘trouble, 
annoyance, irritation, inconvenience, offence or suffering to the local community in 
general, rather than to individual victims’ (ONS, 2019). It is important to note that 
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recorded crime counts capture only a small subset of nuisance incidents reported to the 
Police. In 2016, for example, only around 20% of nuisance incidents reported to the 
Police were subsequently recorded as crimes in GM. Nevertheless, whilst the majority of 
nuisance incidents (e.g., Anti-Social Behaviour) might not meet the standards required 
to be recorded as a crime, they have been argued to hold a detrimental impact upon 
neighbourhood social cohesion (Innes, 2014). In these terms, it is plausible that nuisance 
incidents serve as a useful measure of collective, rather than individual-based, social 
control. Similarly, in 2016 only around 40% of violent incidents reported to the police in 
GM were recorded as crimes, with around 15% of these recorded under a different crime 
category. Cumulatively, these insights highlight the advantage of using calls-for-service 
data to more fully capture neighbourhood experiences of crime. 
 
Social disorganisation variables 
In line with previous research, we use a range of measures to capture neighbourhood 
social disorganisation processes including concentrated disadvantage, residential 
mobility, ethnic heterogeneity, family disruption and urbanisation (Shaw and McKay 
1942; Sampson 1987; Sampson and Groves 1989). In addition, we use a measure of the 
density of charities to capture neighbourhood organisation structures that have 
previously, and in US-based studies, been associated with enhancing social cohesion 
and collective efficacy (Sampson 2012). Specifically, the research employs the following 
measures: 
 
Concentrated Disadvantage: We measure concentrated disadvantage using the 2015 
Index of Multiple Deprivation. It is a relative measure of deprivation calculated at the 
neighbourhood level and comprising of a range of indicators. We calculate the 2015 IMD 
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based on six dimensions of deprivation1: income, employment, health, education, 
barriers to housing and services, and the living environment. 
 
Residential turnover: We measure residential turnover with reference to the 2011 
Census, which calculates the inflows and outflows of people to and from an LSOA in the 
year prior to the Census. This is expressed as percentage of the 2011 LSOA resident 
population.  
 
Ethnic diversity:  We use the 2011 Census ethnicity variable to calculate diversity 
using Simpson’s (1949) diversity index which captures the probability of two randomly 
chosen individuals within one neighbourhood being members of different ethnic 
categories.  
 
Family disruption:  This is measured by the percentage of lone parents in each LSOA 
and is drawn from the 2011 Census.  
 
Urbanisation: The degree of urbanisation is a measure of the number of persons per 
hectare in an LSOA and is drawn from the 2011 Census. 
 
Neighbourhood organisation infrastructure variables 
Voluntary and community organisations: We calculate the density of charitable 
organisations (per 1,000 population) via utilisation of the UK charities register. A charity 
in the UK is defined as an organisation that has an exclusively charitable purpose and 
exists for the public benefit. In line with previous US studies, we assess the influence of 
                                                 
1 The published IMD scores also include a crime domain which has been excluded from the IMD used in this study. 
 14 
charities by type on the assumption that they do not necessarily hold a uniform influence 
on crime. On the basis of available UK charities register data, we grouped charities by 
type of operation and the intended beneficiary group under four categories: economic; 
employment and community development; amateur sports; children and young people; 
and, human rights, religious and racial harmony. We follow Wo et al (2016) and estimate 
the number of charities within a 0.5 mile radius from the charity’s registered postcode 
because the reach of community organisations operating within a neighbourhood is likely 
to extend in surrounding neighbourhoods. Further, and also in line with previous US 
studies (Slocum et al., 2013; Wo, Hipp and Boessen, 2016), we examine the effect of the 
density of well-established charities, defined here as  those that have been operating for 
more than 5 years. 
 
The descriptive statistics of the variables deployed in the research are presented in Table 
1.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Analytical strategy 
 
The analytical strategy entailed estimation of Bayesian models using Integrated Nested 
Laplace Approximation (INLA). Bayesian modelling approaches have increasingly been 
applied in the analysis of crime data (Luan, et al. 2016; Tabb et al. 2016; Mahfoud et 
al.,2020) because of their capacity to integrate the analysis of spatial and temporal 
associations in a given data. This is important as events (i.e., incidents) drawn from 
geographically and temporally close units tend to be more similar than events drawn from 
units further apart. This is known as spatial and temporal autocorrelation. The analytical 
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complexity of such a task is beyond traditional statistical approaches. INLA is a 
deterministic analytical approach for Bayesian inference, which draws on Latent 
Gaussian Models (LGM) and uses a three-step process involving Laplace Approximation 
(LA) and numerical integration to derive posterior distributions for the parameters of 
interest (see Mahfoud et al.,2020 for a detailed explanation of the estimation process).  
In essence, Bayesian inference seeks to probe the likelihood of associations in data 
through an assessment of uncertainty, described by suitable probability distributions, so 
that there is no distinction between observable data or unobservable parameters 
(considered as random quantities) (Blangiardo and Cameletti, 2015). Unlike typical 
regression models, the model specification includes random effects that help account for 
spatial and temporal autocorrelation enabling fixed and random effects to be taken into 
account when examining crime patterns (Ross et al., 2012). 
There are three key advantages of the INLA approach.  Firstly, previous research has 
tended to utilise frequentist approaches, which model spatial and temporal data on the 
assumption of independence. In contrast, INLA models adequately account for spatial 
and temporal dependence allowing random spatio-temporal effects to be included in 
the models. This enables less biased and more efficient parameter estimates to be 
obtained.  Secondly, is its ability to take into account uncertainty in the model estimates 
and prediction results. In the Bayesian regression models probability distributions rather 
than point estimates are used to determine the posterior probability parameters of the 
probability distribution which allows quantification of the uncertainty in the models. 
Thirdly, because it uses numerical integration, and thus holds a computational advantage 
over other Bayesian methods (such as Markov Chain Monte Carlo), which enables 
nested models to be easily fitted and compared using the Deviance Information Criterion 
(DIC) (Luan et al. 2016; Tabb et al. 2016). The model can be specified as follows: 
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Equation 1 includes observed crime counts for neighbourhood i (1…1642) at time point 
t (2012,…, 2016) are modelled as counts drawn from a Poisson distribution  
 
  
log(𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = log(𝐸𝐸𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + α + β𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖 +  𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 + φ𝑖𝑖 + 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖+𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
 
 
and offset by the population rate per 1000 population in neighbourhood i at time t.  
 
Equation 2 includes a vector of covariates X and spatial effects,  a structured component 
 𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖 , which accounts for local variability and correlation between neighbouring areas, and 
an unstructured part 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖, which captures remaining information as well as temporal effects 
(yt + 𝜑𝜑t), which captures the time trend across the study area. The model also includes 
a space-time interaction (wit) to take into account departures from main spatial and main 
temporal effects (Luan  et al., 2016).  We used an intrinsic conditional autoregressive 
(ICAR) prior distribution for both spatial and temporal structured parts of INLA, which 
assumes spatial and temporal adjacency and its influence on a given area or time point. 
We chose weakly informative priors to build the models. To ensure that the choice of 
prior does not affect the results, these were then compared with more informative priors, 







This section reports (see Table 2) the assessment of the association between 
(dimensions of) social disorganisation and collective efficacy and both violent and 
nuisance incidents reported to the police in GM in the period 2012-16. Model 1 is the 
model of social disorganisation, incorporating measures of concentrated disadvantage, 
ethnic diversity, residential turnover, family disruption and urbanisation. Model 2 is the 
model of collective efficacy, extending Model 1 through the incorporation of a measures 
of neighbourhood organisation infrastructure (i.e., the density of charitable organisations 
by type).  
 
Model 1 suggests that for every unit increase in concentrated disadvantage there is a 
3% increase in violent incidents and a 2% increase in nuisance incidents2. To place this 
finding in context, the most deprived neighbourhoods in GM possess a level of 
concentrated disadvantage 20 points higher than the average. Thus, these 
neighbourhoods are exposed to violent and nuisance incident rates 60% and 40% above 
the average, respectively. Turning to examine the other dimensions of social 
disorganisation, the following can be discerned: ethnic diversity is associated with an 
increase in violent incidents, but not in nuisance incidents; residential turnover is 
associated with an increase in both violent and nuisance incidents; family disruption is 
associated with an increase in nuisance but not in violent incidents; and, the degree of 
urbanisation is weakly associated with both violent and nuisance incidents. In order to 
assess the relative importance of the different dimensions of social disorganisation in 
accounting for calls-for-service we compared nested models using the change in the 
deviance information criterion (DIC). The results showed that the inclusion of 
                                                 
2 The association between each of the social disorganisation / collective efficacy measures and reported 
crime can be interpreted more easily through exponentiating the model coefficients. We follow this 
approach here. 
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concentrated disadvantage improved the fit of the models significantly, whereas the 
inclusion of the other social disorganisation variables led to little improvement in the 
model fit. 
 
Model 2 (see Table 2) indicates that the density of neighbourhood organisation 
infrastructure holds little or no effect on either violent or nuisance incidents in GM, given 
that the credible intervals include zero for three out of four charity variables. Only the 
density of human rights, religious and racial harmony charities can be seen to hold a 
protective effect on violent and nuisance incidents. Overall, however, there is little 
improvement in the model fit as indicated by the deviance information criterion (DIC)3 
following the inclusion of the neighbourhood organisation infrastructure variables. 
Voluntary and community organisations seemingly hold limited influence in accounting 
for variation in neighbourhood exposure to (reported) crime. We carried out additional 
analyses in order to assess whether this finding was a consequence of the measure of 
neighbourhood organisation infrastructure deployed or of the data used to generate it. 
Firstly, and in a similar vein to the approach adopted by Sampson (2012), we assessed 
the influence of the total number of charities upon violent and nuisance incidents. Once 
more, however, no substantive association was found. Secondly, the measure of 
neighbourhood organisation infrastructure was calculated with reference to an alternate 
data resource, Ordinance Survey Points of Interest (POI) data (Ordnance Survey, 2015). 
Doing so, however, yielded similar results to those generated by utilising the UK Charities 
register and did not serve to improve the model fit.  
 
                                                 
3 Lower DIC values generally indicate a better model fit. 
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Model 3, also presented in Table 2, considered the potential existence and influence of 
interaction effects between concentrated disadvantage and neighbourhood organisation 
infrastructure by type, upon violent and nuisance incidents. Whilst the findings serve to 
identify the existence of interaction effects, specifically between concentrated 
disadvantage and both economic/community development and young people/children 
charities, they do not serve to improve the model fit. There is only a modest change in 
the DIC in comparison to the previous model. In other words, the influence of 
neighbourhood organisation infrastructure upon reported crime does not differ 
substantially according to the level of concentrated disadvantage. Given that, across all 
models, the magnitude of the effect of concentrated disadvantage upon reported violent 
and nuisance crime remains unchanged, neighbourhood organisation infrastructure does 
not serve to mediate the association between deprivation and crime.  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
The posterior summaries of the precision of the random (spatial and temporal) effects 
are shown at the bottom of table 2. The precision of an effect is given by the inverse of 
its variance, meaning that larger precision terms indicate smaller variance of the effect. 
The unstructured and structured spatial precision terms are relatively small for both 
violence and nuisance incidents, indicating large spatial variability in the occurrence of 
these incidents after adjusting for social disorganisation characteristics. In contrast, the 
unstructured and structured temporal precision terms are relatively large for both 
violence and nuisance incidents, indicating temporal stability in the occurrence of these 
incidents. The space-time precision term which accounts for residual spatial variation not 
accounted for by the main time and space effects is also larger than the space precision 
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terms. Taken together, these results suggest that the spatial effects dominate the spatio-
temporal variation of violence and nuisance incidents in Greater Manchester.  We 
observe little change in the size of the spatial and temporal precision terms across the 
three models suggesting the contribution of each random effect to the total variance does 
not change much after the inclusion of social disorganisation characteristics. 
 
To date, the presentation of the results has centred on the assessment of the capacity 
of specific measures of concentrated disadvantage, social disorganisation and collective 
efficacy to account for inequality in the exposure to crime at the neighbourhood level. 
Figure 1, using the posterior probabilities drawn from model 2, depicts neighbourhoods 
where the residual risk of violent and nuisance incidents is higher than the average risk 
in GM after all social disorganisation and neighbourhood organisation infrastructure 
characteristics (Model 2) are taken into account. It is evident that there is significant 
residual geographic variability remaining. In other words, the maps serve to indicate the 
limitation of the variables utilised by this study in accounting for the variance in violent 
and nuisance incidents in GM. There are a number of observations that can be drawn 
from the patterning evident in the maps. Firstly, clusters of neighbourhoods with higher 
than expected violent and nuisance rates are situated in the central GM districts, 
particularly Manchester and Salford. These districts encompass 40% and 30% 
respectively of the most deprived neighbourhoods in England according to the 2015 IMD. 
Moreover, the majority of neighbourhoods in these districts can be defined as being in 
close proximity to Manchester city centre. There are also clusters of neighbourhoods with 
higher than expected violence and nuisance rates situated towards the periphery of the 
study area. These clusters typically comprise more affluent neighbourhoods. Secondly, 
it is in the neighbourhoods closest to town and city centres that the highest density of 
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charities can be found, finding presence in neighbourhoods with both lower and higher 
than expected violence and nuisance rates. In summary, these results provide little 
support for the proposition that community and voluntary organisations exert influence 






Utilising calls-for-service (incident data) to the Police, a measure considered to be closer 
to the ‘lived experience of crime’ (Warner and Pierce 1993) and one increasingly 
deployed in US-based ecological studies of crime (Sherman 1995; Weisburd et al. 2006; 
Weisburd 2015), this paper has sought to examine the relevance of concentrated 
disadvantage, as well as measures of social disorganisation and collective efficacy in 
accounting for inequality in the exposure to violent and nuisance incidents at the 
neighbourhood level in Greater Manchester (UK). The research was provoked by recent 
studies querying of the relevance of social disorganisation and collective efficacy, or at 
least of the measures typically deployed as representative of them in US studies, to 
European settings (Pauwels et al. 2018). It was also stimulated by the sparsity of 
research examining the role of neighbourhood organisation infrastructure, as a measure 
of collective efficacy, in reducing exposure to crime at the neighbourhood level in 
particular.  
 
The research found concentrated disadvantage to hold a strong association with 
neighbourhood exposure to both violent and nuisance crime though perhaps not to the 
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same extent as in the US where concentrated disadvantage (intensity and spatial 
patterning) varies more markedly.  It found limited evidence, however, of typical 
measures of social disorganisation serving to further exacerbate such exposure.  In 
contrast to US studies, ethnic heterogeneity, residential turnover and family disruption 
accounted for limited variation in calls-for-service. Moreover, the research found these 
results to be consistent across the five years of calls-for-service data incorporated in the 
analyses. Our results show small temporal variability in the occurrence of violence and 
nuisance incidents  in Greater Manchester after adjusting for social disorganisation 
characteristics. 
 
 In interpreting these findings, it seems plausible to surmise that concentrated 
disadvantage and its associated or consequential markers of social disorganisation 
emerge from an interplay between the political-economy of nation states and their 
respective welfare expenditure (inclusive of delivery format), i.e., they are temporally and 
spatially context specific.  While both the US and UK have liberal welfare states, in the 
US welfare programmes are designed by individual states and funded, in part, by 
expenditure resourced with local taxes and fees. This results in substantive variation in 
the existence and nature of such services across states and cities in the US. In contrast, 
the UK holds a centralised welfare system that tends towards assuring more geographic 
equality. In the US access to resources and institutions is also restricted to residents of 
those communities unlike European countries where access to resources is not 
determined by where people live (Howell 2019).  
 
Distinctions between the political-economies of the US and UK and their respective 
welfare regimes, therefore, likely account for the differing relevance and significance of 
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certain measures of social disorganisation. This helps explain why neighbourhoods with 
the highest levels of concentrated disadvantage in the UK, in contrast to the US, are 
neither inherently residentially unstable (Bailey and Livingston 2007) nor necessarily the 
most ethnically diverse (Garner 2011) and consequently why these measures hold more 
limited relevance in accounting for inequalities in neighbourhood exposure to crime. More 
generally, this helps explain why the neighbourhood context in the US may have a 
greater effect on generating inequalities in the exposure to crime.  
 
The finding that concentrated disadvantage, the core dimension of social disorganisation 
in this study, held greater relevance in accounting for inequality in the exposure to violent, 
as opposed to, nuisance, crime merits further consideration. Whilst it is to be expected 
that a breakdown of informal social control increases the likelihood of neighbourhood 
residents making calls-for-service to the police (Warner and Pierce 1993; Hirschfield and 
Bower 1997), it is also known that the propensity of reporting crime varies according to 
the socio-economic status of neighbourhoods and by crime type (Black 1976; Baumer 
2002; Tarling and Morris 2010). Nuisance (less serious) crimes tend to be less frequently 
reported, particularly in deprived neighbourhoods (Hope et al. 2001). The weaker 
association between concentrated disadvantage and the reporting of nuisance crimes 
may arise due to a heightened tolerance of such crimes in the most deprived 
neighbourhoods (Foster 1995) or, given the extent of violent crimes in these 
neighbourhoods, it may reflect a low level of confidence in the police to address less 
serious crimes (Jackson et al. 2009). 
 
Contrary to expectations founded on the existing US research base (Sampson, 2012; 
Corconan et al. 2018; Slocum et al. 2013; Wo et al. 2016), the research found limited 
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evidence to support the proposition that the presence of neighbourhood organisational 
infrastructure, understood as a dimension of collective efficacy, served to lower exposure 
to crime in neighbourhoods. We found, at best, a weak association between the density 
of charitable organisations (by type) and both violent and nuisance incidents. We also 
found no evidence to suggest that the effect of community and voluntary organisations 
on crime rests upon the level of concentrated disadvantage. The limited protective effect 
on neighbourhood exposure to both violent and nuisance incidents associated with the 
presence of human rights / racial and religious harmony charities is noteworthy. Yet, if 
this type of charitable organisation acts to enhance the development of bridging ties, 
fostering social cohesion (Putnam 2007) and laying the foundation for civic engagement 
and collection action (Sampson 2006; 2012), the larger question is why other types of 
neighbourhood organisational infrastructure do not. 
 
Once more, it is necessary to reflect on the differing political-economies and welfare 
regimes of the US and the UK. Specifically, upon how these have informed the 
development of the charitable sectors in these polities. In the UK, as previously noted, 
successive governments have sought to increase the involvement of voluntary and 
community organisations in welfare provision, matched by a commensurate move to 
decrease the involvement of the state in this area (McAreavey and Brown 2019). In these 
terms, voluntary organisations have filled the vacuum created by a shrinking state. Their 
existence and spatial manifestation, at least in part, is reflective of the pre-existing public 
service infrastructure (and expenditure) and of its pre-existing endeavour to address the 
consequences of concentrated disadvantage. This is in contrast to the US wherein 
community organisations are more bottom-up, grassroots-driven (Haugh and Kitson 
2007; Kerlin 2006) and less reliant on government funding for its existence (Clifford et al. 
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2010). Thus, and in the US, neighbourhood organisation infrastructure is more likely to 
develop in socially organised neighbourhoods (Slocum et al. 2013), and to be reflective 
of the civic capacity of neighbourhoods, and of the collective action required to enact 
informal social control (Sampson 2012; Warren 2001).  
 
If not a consequence of collective efficacy, it is understandable that neighbourhood 
organisation infrastructure in the UK holds limited influence in reducing exposure to 
crime. Yet, and in this context, it is also important to recognise that (post 2010) 
government spending cuts have disproportionally hit the voluntary sector, with those 
organisations located in the most deprived local authorities being the most severely 
affected by these cuts (Clifford et al. 2010; Hastings et al. 2017; Clifford 2017). Thus, 
many voluntary sector organisations, have been forced to close or contract their services 
(Jones et al.  2016; Clifford 2017), with voluntary sector organisations involved in the 
delivery of offender management, rehabilitation and treatment services being severely 
affected (Mythen et al. 2012). Viewed in this light, it is possible that the limited influence 
of neighbourhood organisation infrastructure on crime might also be in part consequence 
of the time period examined in this research. Having said this, it is important to note that 
the measures of charitable organisations deployed in this study were crude. It was not 
possible to assess whether the registered location of charities served as an accurate 
marker of their areas of operation, nor was it possible to assess whether the duration of 
a charitable organisation’s operation served to account for its influence as has been 
found in US-based studies (Sampson 2006; Corconan et al. 2018).  
 
Re-examining the relevance of social disorganisation and collective efficacy, this 
research has served to highlight the importance of concentrated disadvantage (whilst 
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also delineating its limitations) in accounting for neighbourhood inequalities in the 
exposure to crime in the UK. On the other hand, it has also found that typical dimensions 
of social disorganisation and collective efficacy (or at least the measures of which that 
were deployed in this study) to hold more limited relevance in accounting neighbourhood 
inequalities in the exposure to crime. To be clear, this does not detract from the potential 
value of these concepts in helping explain crime. Rather, it serves to illustrate that 
criminological inquiry and theoretical development requires recognising that it is strongly 
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  Mean SD Min Max 
Calls-For-Service-Violence_Y12 23.8 19.5 0.0 216.2 
Calls-For-Service-Violence_Y13 24.7 18.5 0.0 123.9 
Calls-For-Service-Violence_Y14 22.5 16.7 0.6 120.2 
Calls-For-Service-Violence_Y15 24.5 18.4 0.7 140.1 
Calls-For-Service-Violence_Y16 25.4 18.8 0.0 123.1 
Calls-For-Service-Nuisance_Y12 40.3 25.6 3.2 191.9 
Calls-For-Service-Nuisance_Y13 40.4 25.7 3.2 216.7 
Calls-For-Service-Nuisance_Y14 37.1 24.3 2.2 189.7 
Calls-For-Service-Nuisance_Y15 34.4 21.9 2.6 164.2 
Calls-For-Service-Nuisance_Y16 35.2 23.9 1.3 153.8 
Charities: Young people 7.3 7.3 0.0 84.2 
Charities: Sports 2.2 1.8 0.0 14.0 
Charities: Human rights 0.4 0.7 0.0 6.6 
Charities: Com. Development 1.7 1.9 0.0 15.9 
Urbanisation 44.6 27.6 0.6 249.1 
Concentrated Disadvantage 25.1 17.1 1.3 73.1 
Residential Turnover 20.6 13.1 6.3 150.1 
Ethnic Diversity 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.9 
Lone parents 12.6 5.5 0.1 34.0 
 
























   
  Violence Nuisance 
  (1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3) 
intercept 1.89 1.86 1.83 2.52 2.48 2.50 
  (1.78,1.99) (1.76,1.97) (1.72,1.96) (2.43,2.61) (2.39,2.58) (2.40,2.59) 
Concentrated 
Disadvantage 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
  (0.03,0.03) (0.03,0.03) (0.03,0.03) (0.02,0.03) (0.02,0.03) (0.02,0.03) 
Ethnic Diversity 0.39 0.38 0.31 0.10 0.08 0.08 
  (0.20,0.59) (0.19,0.58) (0.11,0.52) (-0.07,0.27) (-0.10,0.26) (-0.09,0.26) 
Residential 
Turnover 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (0.01,0.02) (0.01,0.02) (0.01,0.02) (0.01,0.02) (0.01,0.02) (0.01,0.02) 
Lone Parents 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 
  (-0.00,0.01) (-0.00,0.01) (-0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.01) (0.00,0.02) (0.00,0.02) 
Urbanisation -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 
  (-0.00,-0.00) (-0.00,-0.00) (-0.00,-0.00) (-0.00,-0.00) (-0.00,-0.01) (-0.00,-0.00) 
Charities: 
Young people 
&  children  
  0.00 -0.01   0.00 -0.00 
  (-0.00,0.01) (-0.01,0.01)   (-0.00,0.01) (-0.01,0.00) 
Charities: 
Amateur 
Sports    0.02 0.01   0.01 0.01 




harmony   
  -0.07 -0.01   -0.07 0.00 





  0.02 0.07   0.02 0.05 
  (-0.00,0.05) (0.03,0.11)   (-0.01,0.04) (0.01,0.09) 
Charities: 
Young people 
&  children  x 
deprivation     0.00     0.00 




deprivation     0.00      0.00 




harmony  x 
deprivation     -0.00      -0.00  





deprivation     -0.00     -0.00 
      (-0.00,-0.00)     (-0.00,0.00) 
Random 
effects 
(Precision, τ = 






































































 (8.19, 10.82) 
















       
DIC 51853.56 51852.32 51855.29 57109.3 57105.76 57110.07 










Note: 95% Credible Intervals are shown in parentheses. Deviance Information Criterion 
(DIC) change compares the DIC obtained from each preceding model. For model 1 the 




                                                                          
 
Figure 1: Expected risk of violent and nuisance calls-for-service incidents (left) and 
highest density of charities per 1,000 population  (right) in Greater Manchester, 2012-
2016.  
 
Notes: 1. LSOAs shown in white have been excluded from the analysis as they are 
predominantly non-residential. 2. Dark shaded LSOAs are those with higher than the 
overall risk for Greater Manchester.3. Neighbourhoods with the highest density of 
charities are those in the top decile of the charities distribution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
